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which is likely to come in conflict with the greater personality of the state. Such conflict, whether merely logical or of a more practical kind, may be avoided by assigning to the state a definite existence apart from the government. Another disadvantage of Dr. Willoughby's system, interesting but perhaps not so important, lies in the fact that in its demonstration the political philosopher commits scientific suicide. The study of governmental organization already belongs to constitutional law. The system we are considering proposes to throw over to sociology, already waiting to receive it, the study of public opinion and the other political forces that lie outside of governmental organization. What is to be left for political philosophy?

WM. A. DUNNING.

Introduction to Political Science. By J. R. SEELEY. New York and London, Macmillan & Co., 1896. — xi, 387 pp.

Under the above title are posthumously published two courses of lectures, which, contrary to Professor Seeley's wont, had been reduced to full written statement. The discursive style indicates the conversational method of instruction usually employed by their author; but this, though at times leading to prolixity, does not prevent the presentation of a very considerable body of interesting and valuable observations within the limited compass of the book. The introductory lecture, which is devoted to a statement of the necessary relationship between history and political science, both explains the purpose and suggests the chief value of the work. The one is the statement of a method; and the other, its fruitful application in the subsequent lectures. The method consists of the use of the inductive material afforded by history in the interpretation of political facts; and the specific application of this method is to the solution of that vexed question—the classification of states. Of the various characteristics which may form the basis of such classification, we shall be able to dwell only upon one—namely, the possession or non-possession of a “government-making” organ—which Professor Seeley has very happily selected and fruitfully applied.

All governments depending, as Hume says, on opinions rather than force, the government-making power in every state rests on that “group of persons, small or large, foreign or native, disinterested or selfish, upon whose support the government depends.” Such a group necessarily exists in every state, but whether or not it possesses a definite organ through which its will may habitually and

regularly act, depends upon special conditions. In a presidential government or elective monarchy, such an organ is to be found in the suffrage and at the polls. In an absolute government, on the other hand, such an organ of volition being wanting, revolution or assassination is the only recourse when the power on which a government has been previously depending becomes unwilling longer to support it. Thus, the significant fact in the constitutional development of England, says Professor Seeley, has been the growth of a supreme parliamentary body which, if not in name, is in fact an organ through which governments are being continually made and unmade. The English do not have revolutions, because they have reduced revolution to a system and given it a legal form. They are having revolutions all the time, and therefore, in a certain sense, never have one.

Probably the most interesting chapter in the book is that in which the author seeks to show that this government-making work is now Parliament's chief function, and is not a duty incidental to the discharge of its assumed supreme office of legislation. Thirty years ago Bagehot showed how different in his day was the practice of Parliament from its theory as stated by Blackstone. But now it is probably as necessary to distinguish the actual functions of Parliament from those so clearly stated by Bagehot, as it was then necessary to distinguish them from those of Blackstone's statement. We are apt to think of Parliament, or at least its lower house, as primarily and predominantly a legislative body; and of the ministry as a set of executive officials whose chief duty it is to carry into execution the measures laid down by the larger body of which they are incidentally members. Such is far from the truth. As a matter of sober fact, the ministry, as such, possesses almost all, if not all, the effective power of legislation. Nominally, of course, no bill can become an act save by the will of the majority of the House; but a consideration of the conditions under which that will is expressed, makes evident the fact that such a power of determination is of value in name only. In all important bills the House, it is true, is granted a certain freedom in dealing with minor details; but it must take the essential parts of the bill, or be prepared to dismiss the ministry and install the opposite party in office. This latter alternative the experience of the last twenty years shows it will not adopt. As recently stated by another critic, Mr. Sidney Low: "In practice we may take it that whatever the theory of the constitution may be, a ministry once put into office by the vote of the electorate can count on the votes of the whole body of its supporters for any

legislative project whatsoever, until it chooses, or is compelled, to dissolve Parliament." In other words, votes are not turned in Parliament, experience showing that in these days a ministry is defeated or compelled to dissolve, not by defections from its own party, but by the adverse results of by-elections: governments are defeated in the constituencies, but no longer in the House.

If this be true, — and the facts seem so to indicate, — then even that modicum of power ascribed by Professor Seeley to the House of Commons as a whole, is not properly so placed. The real government-making power is in the electorate, or, more strictly still, in the caucus, using the term caucus in its English sense. No points are at the present day being more commented upon by critics of English politics, than the extent to which the caucus is increasing its influence; and the strictness with which members are being bound, when elected, to vote for particular ministries, and thus made to serve rather as delegates of the electorate than as representatives. What effect the present tendency of the House to separate into a dozen or more smaller political parties will have in this connection, by rendering the ministry's maintenance of a majority more difficult, remains to be seen. Without dwelling longer upon this point, however, one cannot but speculate as to what effects may be expected to follow from this enhancement of the powers of the cabinet as compared with those of the whole House; and from the former's increased dependence in turn upon the wishes of the electorates, when taken in connection with the broadened rights of suffrage, whereby the more ignorant and less orderly minded members of the populace are furnished with the ballot. If we are to admit that there is any validity in the views put forward in the just-published work of the historian Lecky, the English political horizon is not entirely without threatening clouds.

Returning now more directly to Professor Seeley's book, it is subject to almost no criticism other than has been indicated. To be sure, he has not provided a classification of states that is scientifically exact—one that permits a hard and fast line to be drawn between his various categories; nor are those categories in their sum exhaustive. But it was scarcely the purpose of the book to do this. An excellent method has been admirably applied; and essential characteristics of state life have been seized upon whereby different polities may be distinguished, not only as to their governmental organizations, but as to the principles upon which they are based and the motives by which they are actuated. The relativity of political principles—that

is, their dependence upon given objective and subjective conditions—is well shown. Especially is this illustrated in the treatment of autocracy and religious toleration. Particular mention should also be made of the last four lectures of Course I, in which the concept of political liberty is analyzed in a thoroughly philosophical manner, and the idea in its correct meaning is applied to concrete conditions in a way that cannot but afford sound practical information.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

W. W. WILLOUGHBY.

Proportional Representation. By JOHN R. COMMONS, Professor of Sociology in Syracuse University. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1896.—298 pp.

Among the remedies most ardently advocated of late years for misgovernment, and particularly for municipal misgovernment, is proportional representation. This seems to be the form which has been given to the movement for minority representation that had so much force twenty-five years ago. It is very opportune, therefore, that the subject has been treated in the new form which it has assumed. As Professor Commons points out, our present ideas of representation are moulded by the facts of a political life which has now very largely ceased. Originally it was regarded as essential to secure the representation of neighborhoods; but now that these have become less distinctive, the need of neighborhood representation has almost vanished. Neighborhood feeling has died out almost completely in municipalities except in those of great size; and while not extinct in the states, it is by no means so strong as formerly, nor is it confined by so narrow circumscriptions. Almost all districts having thus become more homogeneous, from the point of view of the opinions which are based on peculiar local conditions, it is apparently necessary to find some basis of representation other than neighborhood or locality. This basis is found by the advocates of proportional representation in social opinions. The argument that representation based on this idea will lead to the formation of social parties is answered by the statement that proportional representation would not be responsible for the existence of these opinions, but would merely recognize what already exists, and would thereby subserve the purposes of justice.

Professor Commons devotes much of his book to showing the unfairness of both general-ticket and district-ticket representation, which from the point of view of representation in many cases have the same result; and he cites in illustration the New York city